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Abstract
 
 
This project deals about the rejection of the food traffic light labelling by the European Parliament. The 
traffic light was meant to indicate the nutritional information (regarding sugar, salt, fat and saturated 
fat) in a coloured way, in which red represented high amounts of certain content, yellow represented a 
medium amount and green a low amount of one of the above mentioned nutritional amounts. This 
proposal is part of the wider Commissions Proposal (2008) regarding the nutritional labelling of food. 
The main interest in this project is to understand the reasons why the EP has rejected the food traffic 
light and especially to investigate if the rejection was due to business lobbyist influence. The later point 
is the main focus of this project. In order to answer the question, the method of preference attainment 
will be used. Using this method, the preferences of the business interest groups will be compared 
against the adopted European Parliament legislative resolution (first reading). Besides this, the input 
from an anti-Lobby NGO will be used as well in order to increase the validity. The theoretical 
perspective of this paper will be rational choice theory from Pollack and Scharpf. In addition the 
findings from Greenwood and Michalowitz will be used to complement the theoretical part. In the end 
of this paper, the analysis will show that it is very likely to assume that the European Parliament has 
been influenced by Business interest groups and has also adopted their proposal regarding nutritional 
labelling. The project will end with a summarising conclusion and with a few afterthoughts.   
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5 
Introduction 
 
In a report from the year 2006, the euobserver.com published an article with the title: “Obesity 
epidemic costs EU €59 billion a year.” In the first section of the report it was estimated, that the actual 
health related costs on the whole economy, from obesity could reach up to €236 billion. To get an 
understanding, the already conservative estimation is three times the size of Bulgaria’s GDP. The 
article continues to mention possible effects of Obesity, which can be: “…depression, a short attention 
span, sick days at work, earlier retirement, lower life expectancy and infertility.”
1
 In addition, already 
in 2006, the economy within the EU was grumbling from an ageing population and from competition 
from Asia.
2
 The article finishes with a pessimistic future outlook. Until today, the situation of obesity 
has not changed much. An article from the World Health Organisation (Regional Office for Europe) 
from 2013 also mentions the negative aspects of overweight and presents other health related articles.3 
In a recently published article, the WHO warns from the too high salt consumption and its health 
damaging effects. “The shaker on the dining table, however, does not account for the largest share of 
salt intake. For example, 80% of intake in the European Union (EU) comes from processed foods such   
as cheese, bread and ready meals. Many people consume far more salt than they realize, with negative 
results…”4 Further reports from the WHO mention other, health related diseases, such as Diabetes 
which are mainly caused from an unhealthy diet.
5
 In a figure the WHO presents that nutrition related 
health diseases rank on second place, just after the health related effects of alcohol and tobacco 
consumption. In order to tackle the health problem of Obesity the European Commission’s health 
commissioner MarkosKyprianou presented in 2008 (30
th
 of Jan) a proposal that would display key 
nutritional information about fat, salt and sugar volume on front of pre-packaged food 
(COM(2008)0040). The Commission had made this policy to one of their main issues in order to 
provide consumers, among other food labelling related aspects, with an easy to understand label 
regarding basic nutritional information
6
. In its general provisions, the Commission´s proposal 
demanded for nutrition labelling so that consumers have easy access to information about the health 
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related nutritional facts. It is the aim of the Commission to support consumers in making health 
sensible choices as per their diet. This proposal led to the development of a traffic light system for 
food, which should provide an easy understanding of fat, sugar and salt contents of a product. 
Consumer and health organisations had been in favour of this labelling. However, at the 16
th
 of June 
2010, the European Parliament rejected the food traffic light proposal. Instead it was made mandatory 
to have nutritional information on the package of products.7 After the rejection of the traffic light 
labelling, there were many voices (within the EU by MEPs and the Press) which assumed that the EP 
was following the wishes of food interest groups. (See articles in: EUobserver: “MEPs reject 'traffic 
light' food labels after €1bn lobby effort”;EurActive: “Food industry wins battle on 'traffic light' 
labels”; European Voice: MEPs reject 'traffic-light' food labels and Corporate Europe Observatory 
“MEP Carl Schlyter: “Industry lobbying has buried ‘traffic-light’ labelling”).8 
 
As known among academic scholars, there is by now agreement that the European institutions offer 
interest organisations space in which they can promote their interest. In addition, the European 
institutions are very dependent upon the input from interest groups in order to acquire knowledge. 
Therefore interest groups enjoy lots of attention from EU institutions.9 Especially the EP and their 
working groups (such as Rapporteurs) are a main target for lobbyist influence.
10
In addition, it is 
interesting to look at the EP, since the EP is the only European institution which is directly elected by 
the European citizens and which has the task to link the citizens to the political system of the EU.
11
 
Therefore the Research question of this project will be: 
 
Is the rejection of the food traffic light proposal by the European Parliament a result of interest 
group influence or is it an example of rational choice decision making by the European Parliament.  
 
At first the methodology section will outline how the project is going to answer the question. The 
issues of the interest groups will be compared against the proposal adopted by the EP. This section will 
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also shed light on alternative ways of answering the RQ and present arguments for the choice of the 
method used. Following this section, the project continues to present the theoretical approach which is 
going to be used in order to help answering the research question. The theoretical contributions 
regarding rational choice decision making from Pollack andScharpfwill be presented. Besides their 
contribution, the findings of Michalowitz and Greenwood will be presented as well, in order to 
complement the theory. After this chapter there will be a short chapter in which necessary background 
knowledge will be presented. This chapter briefly summaries the development of food labelling and 
embeds the proposal which is subject of this project (COM(2008)0040), in the wider policy context. In 
addition, the functioning and the co-decision making will be summarised also, in order to give the 
reader the background knowledge he needs to understand the development of the food labelling 
proposal. This paper will end with the analysis chapter which begins to compare the adopted position 
by the EP against the interest of the business and consumer interest groups. Thereafter the theoretical 
material will be used to answer the research question. The project will end with a conclusion and 
afterthoughts section. The time frame which is analysed by this contribution ranges from the 
presentation of the labelling proposal in 2008 (COM (2008)0040) and ends in June 2010, with the 
rejection of the food traffic light proposal by the EP. The whole project will investigate the 
development and the policy around traffic light proposal, which is a small part of the 2008 
Commissions proposal”…on the provision of food information to consumers.”
12
 
 
 
Background information 
 
In order to have a better under understanding of the project, the policy development regarding food 
labelling will be embedded into the wider political context. Thereafter the necessary background 
knowledge will be presented regarding the functioning of a Commissions White paper and the working 
of the co-decision procedure. 
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Origins of food labeling within the EU 
The origins of the present food label debate go back to the year 1979, in which the EEC adopted 
directive 79/112/EEC. This directive had the aim, to harmonise the labelling, advertisement and 
presentation of food which was meant for direct sale to the end consumer.
13
 The next step in the 
development towards the present policy was the implementation of directive (90/496/EEC) (1990), 
which harmonised”…nutrition labelling of foodstuffs to be delivered as such to the ultimate 
consumer.”
14
 The follow up directive, (2000/13/EC) takes the aspect of nutrition labelling a step further 
and aims that the content labelling should not be misguiding. In addition, important information such as 
ingredients, minimum durability or special storage conditions, should be easy to understand.
15
 
Furthermore, interesting for this present paper, this directive states that the list of ingredients has to be 
indownward order, as per their weight.16 A forerunner of the 2008´s Commission’s proposal (regarding 
the description of food information to consumers, to which this paper refers in the introduction) was a 
White Paper from May 2007. This White Paper mentions already in its introduction, that there has been 
a huge increase in overweight among the EU population and therefore aims to reduce “…ill health due 
to poor nutrition, overweight and obesity.”
17
 The EP first came in contact with food traffic lights at a 
workshop (Nov 2008), which was held regarding the Commission’s proposal.18 
 
The co-decision procedure 
Part of EU legislation making is the co-decision procedure. It normally starts with the Commission 
presenting a White Paper which contains a range of policy proposals directed at a certain policy field.
19
 
In this project the underlying white paper aims to improve ill health which is partly a consequence of 
an unhealthy and unbalanced diet.
20
 A proposal is then developed by the Commission, since it is the 
Commissions right to take initiative. This proposal contains more specific guidelines and ideas which 
should become part of EU law. After the presentation of a Commissions proposal (in this project it is 
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the proposal for a “regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the on the provision of 
food information to consumers “
21
), the topic is transferred to the EP and the Council.   
 
In addition, it is important for the understanding of this project to present in brief the most important 
aspects of the co-decision procedure. The knowledge about the co-decision procedure is relevant 
because this procedure sets out the rules of the game between the different actors (such as EP, 
Commission, Council and each institutions working group). Furthermore, the early stages of a policy 
development, after the Commission has published its proposal, interest groups use this time because it 
is easier for them to influence the process.
22
 The co-decision procedure has to be seen as a process 
consisting of three different stages. Each stage affects what is happening at the later stage either by 
bringing in new possibilities or by diminishing the range of possible policy proposals.23 
At first the Commission publishes its proposal regarding a certain policy. Thereafter the first reading 
stage begins in which the EP can either adopt the Commission’s proposal or amend it. At this stage the 
EP´s committees and rapporteurs get active and start to gather opinions regarding the topic. It is the 
task of the 20 standing committees to discuss the Commission’s proposals and to examine how a 
practical policy could be made out of these. After the Commission presented its proposal, the proposal 
is forwarded to the appropriate committee. Within the committee rapporteurs are then responsible to 
develop a draft policy proposal and to present their amendments to the proposal of the Commission.  In 
this project, the rapporteurs draft legislation and their amendments will be used in the analysis 
section.
24
 
 
The Committees can also have public hearings in order to gain knowledge. During the1
st
the Council 
can decide if they want to agree to the EP´s positions (=adoption of legislative act) or if they want to 
make some changes. In the latter case the proposal goes back to the Commission. Thereafter the 2nd 
reading starts in which the EP can approve the Councils positions (=adoption of legislative act) or 
reject it. Then the proposal goes back to the Council. During this second reading the Council can 
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decide to agree to the EP´s amendments (resulting in an adoption of the legislative proposal) or it can 
also happen that the Council does not agree with all EP´s changes. In that case, the proposal goes to the 
Conciliation Committee. This Committee (consisting of 50% MEPs and Council representatives) tries 
to find a solution. If they are not successful the proposal ends, if they reach an agreement the new 
version goes for a third reading to the EP and the Council. In this 3
rd
 reading the Council and EP can 
accept or discard the latest proposal. If only one of them disagrees, the legislative proposal will not be 
adopted.
25
 
Since the traffic light proposal was already rejected at the first reading (June 2010), the project will 
focus mainly on the time when the Commission published its proposal (2008/0028 (COD)) until the 
rejection of the traffic light proposal at the EP´s first reading in June 2010. This early part of the co-
decision process will be examined in this project.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
The Methodology section of this project will be subdivided into different parts. At first there will be a 
short presentation of the term interest group followed by a discovery of possible ways of analysing 
lobbyist influence. After having presented that this project is aware of the different ways to go, the 
chosen method of “preference attainment” will be presented as will together with possible 
shortcomings. After this sections there will be a section regarding theory of science, source criticism 
and about the delimitation. The last section of this methods chapter will outline how the research 
question is going to be answered.  
 
The Projects definition of interest groups 
To begin, the definition of interest groups used in this project will be presented as per Eisings 
presentation. His definition fits to the research format of this project. He defines interest groups along 
three pillars, namely”…organization, political interests, and informality.”
26
 The term Organizations 
refers to the aim of interest groups, to represent the gathered opinion of individuals or interest 
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organizations. They do not necessarily need to fight for an issue which represents a larger part of public 
opinion. The second term political interest means, that these interest groups try to change the policy 
outcome into a direction which is in line with the interests of their constituencies. Finally, relating to 
the third aspect, it needs to be mentioned that interest groups achieve their goals, most often in areas 
which are not visible to the greater public.
27
 This view of interest groups represents the interest groups 
who are active near the European institutions. The above described notion will apply to the Lobby 
groups which represent the interest of food organisations. Moreover, this notion will also apply to 
consumer interest groups because these groups, similar to business interest groups, have to promote the 
interest of their clientele.  
 
Possible ways of analysing interest group influence 
In order to analyse the effect of interest group influence, the academic literature presents many 
different approaches such as process tracing, “the attributed influence method”
28
 or the comparison 
between the preferences of interest groups and the actual political outcome.
29
 
Process tracing is the most often used method to investigate the influence of interest groups in the EU. 
The methods of process tracing tries to uncover “…the causal chain and causal mechanisms –between 
an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”
30
 In addition, the 
method of process tracing often uses semi structured interviews in which key actor´s such as politicians 
and members of the EU working groups are interviewed. Even though, the method of process tracing is 
suited for a small N study, this method will not be used for this project, because there is the possibility 
that the interviewed persons might over- or underestimate their influence in the policy outcome. This 
could give a negative view of reality. In addition, since it is difficult to have a kind of benchmark in 
order to compare the policy outcome, it is difficult to see the actual influence of interest groups.
31
 
A further method which will not be used in this project is the method of “attributed influence.” Using 
this method, a group can be questioned (here the interest organisations) to judge their influence on 
other groups (in our case, the influence on the EP). This is normally done via a survey. The weaknesses 
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of this study are similar to the previously described method. The responses can be biased and there can 
always be an over or under exaggeration of one’s own influence. In addition, the estimation of one´s 
own influence and the influence other groups have can be over- or underestimated. The literature by 
Dür continues mentioning, that even the method of asking experts is not a waterproof way of gathering 
information, because these experts can be biased as per believing in their research (which could be 
based on one kind of research method). In addition, it is also possible that experts stick to commonly 
accepted opinions (which might not be close to reality).
32
 Another aspect not discussed in this section 
of the literature is that there is no real definition of what an expert is. Even a so called expert might not 
have all the relevant knowledge. Therefore a research might lose on validity if it is just based on the 
findings of expert information.  
 
Method of preference attainment 
In order to answer the research question, the project will use the method of preference attainment. 
Using this method, the final policy (in this case of the Commission, the Council and the EP) will be 
compared to the ideal position of interest groups. Using this methods the “…distance between an 
outcome and the ideal point of an actor reflects the influence of this actor.”33 This method will be used 
because of the following strengths. At first by using this method, the impact of interest groups can be 
spotted, even if nothing directly observable happens. As will be mentioned later in the theory, most of 
lobbyist influence happens without public notice and therefore cannot be detected from a researcher’s 
standpoint. As per Dür, this method is more reliable in uncovering the influence of interest groups, than 
process-tracing would be.34 Furthermore, the method has been chosen, because it is mentioned by 
several other scholars. Michalowitz (2007) and Klüver (2012) also present or refer the method of 
preference attainment.
35
Klüver points out that this method gives an objective way to examine, if a 
lobby campaign was successful.  One can easily see how close a policy outcome stands in comparison 
to the policy preferences of certain actors or interest groups. In addition, since Lobbying happens 
through many different channels which are not that easily visible from the researchers point of view, 
the simple comparison of the lobbyist interest groups and the later policy can show if the decision 
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makers follow business interest groups.36In addition, the findings of an anti-lobby NGO will be used as 
well. Their material presents Emails which have been sending to MEP´s and an interview with one 
rapporteur who was involved during the traffic light policy. To be in line with the methods used, the 
findings from the interview (and the presented Emails) will not be used in a simple way to get a yes or 
no answer regarding the question if MEP´s have been lobbied by business groups, but the findings will 
be used to confirm that lobby activity from the industries side has been taking place.  
 
Shortcomings of method and how they will be taken care of 
As every method, the method used in this paper has certain flaws, which will be mentioned in the next 
lines.
37
 The weaknesses of using my method will be taken into consideration in the analysis and 
afterthoughts section of this paper. It is sufficient to stick to the flaws presented by Dür, since the other 
two above mentioned scholar come to similar conclusions and also refer to Dür (see Klüver 2012, p 
1120f). 
Dür presents four shortcomings. At first he mentions that it is not always easy to define the main aims 
and wishes of actors. This weakness is not applicable to this project, because the official positions of 
the interest groups will be analysed. In addition, with regards to the problem area and the RQ, there is 
no need to doubt the preferences of the interest groups. As per the section of source criticism/ontology, 
the position of the food interest groups will be assumed to be their real points of interest. For this 
project, there is no reason to believe that the food interest group and the consumer interest groups 
pursue policies which are not in line with their clientele.  
Second, it is difficult in this research to rule out alternative causes which could have an influence. Here, 
it is not possible to directly observe why the MEP´s rejected the food traffic light proposal at the 17
th
 of 
June, 2010. With the method which is used in this project, it is not possible to directly examine the 
reasons for the EP to reject the proposal. However, even all the other methods such as process tracing 
or the “attributed influence” method cannot rule out that the decision might be due to certain exogenous 
factors which are not possible to observe.38 
A third weakness is that with the method used in this project, it is also difficult to examine the ways in 
which influence was exercised. However, this position is not relevant for this paper.   
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Finally there are two related aspects which are a weakness of the method.  A: issues have to be very 
precise so that scholars can detect if interest groups have had influence. This problem is not relevant 
with regards to the RQ because the question in this project deals with the rejection of the food traffic 
light by the EP.B: an important aspect, in order to measure the successful influence of an interest 
group, is to look at the importance a certain policy has for the interest groups. The higher the 
importance, the more resources an interest group/the sponsors of an interest group invest in order to be 
successful on the policy. In this project, it is important for food interest groups to get the food traffic 
light rejected. The possible main reason will be presented in the analysis section later.  However, with 
the methods used, it will remain difficult to give an exact estimation of how important this food traffic 
light regulation is to the business interest groups and to the consumer interest groups. However, in the 
analysis, this aspect will be taken into consideration.  
 
During the analysis, the effect of the above mentioned weaknesses will be taken into consideration and 
will be dealt with. To be clear, the method this project uses (Dür) is only one way among other 
methods to go along. A possibility to increase the internal validity of this project is to combine all the 
three discussed methods. However, as Dür mentions, there is also the possibility that by using the 
different methods, different outcomes might arise.
39
 
 
Theory of science 
This subsection will give a brief reflection about my theory of science. The epistemological point of 
view for this paper is interpretationist position. It is believed, that it is possible to generate a 
relationship between social interactions and that these interactions can be examined by direct 
observations.  However, the direct observation needs to be interpreted critically.  In this paper it is 
believe that is possible to create a link between social interactions. With regards to the research 
question, it is not possible to have a direct causal link between the food lobbyist and the actions of the 
EP. The European Parliament would not admit that they have been following the recommendations 
from the food lobby groups (since this would lead to public criticism and would diminish the EPs 
credibility). In addition, the food lobby would not admit that they are against the traffic light proposal 
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due to the fact that this proposal might decrease their sales on unhealthy food (this aspect will be 
discussed in more detail in the analysis section).
40
 
The ontological view in this project will be interpretationist position as well.  This notion fits to my 
research, since it is believed in the view of this project there might be a “real world” which might exist 
outside my knowledge. In this case, the knowledge which is available for this project indicates, that the 
rejection of the food traffic light was a result of rational choice decision making in order to guarantee 
the wellbeing of the European consumes. However, there might be a possibility that the decision of the 
EP was influenced by food interest groups. It is however, not directly possible to examine if the EP has 
been influenced.
41
 
 
Source criticism 
The sources used in this paper will be examined critically. In the analysis, these sources will not be 
viewed on with a naïve perspective. In order to be in line with my RQ, it is especially important to look 
at the documents from the European Institutions (especially the EP and the ENVI committee). 
Additionally, meanings derived from newspapers and academic findings will be triangulated as well in 
order to ensure a high internal validity. This applies to newspaper articles mentioning that the rejection 
of the food traffic light was a beneficial decision for consumers and to literature which favours the food 
traffic light. There is no need to be critical with the information form the food business representatives 
(here FoodDrinkEurope), because it is assumed that they are in line with the interests of the food 
industry. However, special attention will be paid regarding their statements about their proposed 
nutritional labelling scheme. In addition, there is no reason to believe, that the issues FoodDrinkEurope 
promotes would run counter to their clienteles interest.  
 
Delimitation  
In this subsection there will be a short presentation about the aspects this project is not going to deal 
with. This delimitation should help to present the boundaries of this work. To begin with it is important 
to mention, that this paper does not deal with the general impact of business interest groups or how 
such groups influence the decision making and the decision outcomes of the European institution. This 
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paper is also not meant to give a general criticism towards interest group influence, since the input from 
third parties (such as business groups) is vital for the EU policy making.
42
 
   Furthermore, there will be no evaluation of the effectiveness of the policy making. With regards to 
this research, it is not so much of importance to figure out which food labelling proposal is actually the 
better one. That would be a discussion related to the academic fields of psychology 
andchemistry/biology and therefore out of the scope of this paper. Moreover it is important to figure 
out if the argumentation of the EP is in line with the arguments of business interest. The main focus is 
to try to figure out if the EP has been following business interests. In relation to the last aspect, the 
project will also not investigate if consumer and health organisations have tried to influence the EU 
decision making organs (EP, Council and Commission) and their amount of resources.  
  Another aspect this project does not focus is about the inter-institutional aspects of the co-decision 
making procedure and the relationship between EP, Council and Commission. Furthermore, the early 
rejection of the food traffic light could be a result of an early agreement between (Council, Parliament, 
and Commission) and an example of fast rack decision making. The afterthoughts section will pick up 
on this example.
43
 
Finally, to be clear, the main unit of observation is the traffic light proposal, which is just a small part 
of the Commissions 2008 food labelling proposal. There will be no attention paidto other parts of the 
proposal or to the possible implementation of these policies by the Member States. For this reason, this 
paper will also not pay attention to the whole co-decision making process since the traffic light 
proposal was already rejected by the EP at the first reading.  
 
How the RQ will be answered 
In this research, there will be two independent variables. These are the influence of business interest 
groups and the influence of consumer interest groups. These groups will be mentioned later. The 
dependent variable in this research is the political outcome in the European institutions, with special 
focus on the EP´s voting behaviour. At first the analysis will briefly present the Commissions policy 
proposal. Thereafter, the positions of the interest groups will be presented as well. As per our 
methodological approach, the standpoints from the food interest group and the actual outcome of the 
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EP (and the official statement of the EP´s rapporteur who is responsible for the food traffic light 
proposal) will be compared. It is important to see, if the EP´s decision is in line with the interest of the 
food lobby groups. Thereafter, the internal working documents of the Committee on the Environment, 
Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) will pre presented. It is the task of this committee ( and their 
rapporteur) to provide supporting work for the EP´s decision making. The rapporteur for instance, 
develops amendments and suggestions to the Commissions 2008 white paper. By taking a look “behind 
the scenes” of the EP´s day to day work, it might be possible to get information if the EP has been 
aware of alternative solutions regarding food labelling.  
Finally, after having analysed the internal working documents (here the ENVI/rapporteurs amendments 
to the Commissions 2008 food labelling proposal) the theoretical notions will be applied in order to 
fully understand the reasons for the EP´s decision to reject the food traffic light. The whole timeline, in 
this research, will be range from January 2008 until the EP´s rejection of the food traffic light in June 
2010. It is for this project important to see how the food traffic light proposal has been developed and 
which actors where influential. The sources which will be used in this document are: 
- Official EU documents (such as the official statement form the responsible rapporteurs head 
Renate Sommer, amendments from the ENVI Committee and EP´s press releases)  
- Viewpoint from food interest group (FoodDrinkEurope business representation), this project 
will look at their position towards the food traffic light and their alternative labelling suggestion 
- Position from health and consumer interest groups towards the food traffic light (here as 
summarised by Euractive and the European Society of Cardiology) 
- Evidence and findings from anti-Business interest organisation (for this project the findings of 
Corporate Europe Observatory will be referred to) 
After having applied to above mentioned tasks, a possible explanation will be given of how the lobby 
group FoodDrinkEurope could have been active. For this reason the findings of the NGO Corporate 
Europe Observatory will be presented. Part of their findings consists of an interview this NGO has 
done with an MEP (a shadow rapporteur).  This NGO has as its main task to uncover the influence of 
interest group within EU policy making.
44
 So far it is the only NGO, which could be found, that 
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provided background material regarding the food traffic light proposal. In addition, it will also be 
examined if the MEP´s have had already an opinion about food labelling or the traffic light proposal.  
 
 
Theory 
 
This section is going to present the theoretical chapter. Since there is no theory written which has a 
specific focus on lobbyism, this paper will rely mainly rational choice literature. In addition, the gaps 
of the rational choice literature will be filled up by the findings from other articles which have looked 
at lobbyism, from a European perspective. The theory relation to rational choice will be from Pollack 
„Rational Choice and EU Politics.” Pollack’s rational choice concepts will be completed by presenting 
Scharpf´s notions about rational choice theory. There will be special focus on the concepts of actors 
and institutions.  Besides them, there will be contributions from Greenwood and Michalowitz. Their 
input will be used in order to finalise the theory and add important aspects which are relevant for the 
understanding of lobbyist influence in the EU. At the end of the theory chapter, there will be a brief 
critical feedback upon the theory.   
 
Rational choice theory from Pollack and Scharpf 
The main reason to use rational choice theory for this paper is due to the fact, that rational choice 
theory has become more and more part in the analysis of EU decision making.
45
  Rational choice theory 
is useful because it can be used to explain individual and collective decision making. However, due to 
the huge field of rational choice literature it is not enough to rely on the contributions of Pollack alone. 
Therefore this subsection will later be supplemented with rational choice contributions by Scharpf. At 
first Pollack’s theory will be presented. 
   As a starting point, rational choice theory´s first assumption departs form the individual level. 
Therefore, the result of collective action is a sum of individual decision making. Secondly, the theory 
assumes that individuals act in order to increase their own utility.
46
 As per this theory, individual’s does 
not look at the wellbeing of the greater society or act in ways which lie in line with general accepted 
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social rules. A third aspect refers to the fact that decisions are made under constraints. In real life, 
individual actors have to choose between different paths. In addition, as per rational choice theory, 
actors’ action can be influenced by institutions. These institutions can be formal or informal in 
appearance. Another important aspect with regards to the RQ is that often decisions have to be taken, 
even if decision makers’ don´t have full information about the subject they have to decide upon.
47
 
With regards to legislative politics, such as referred to in the introduction of this paper, rational choice 
has been “Without doubt the best-developed strand of rational theory in EU studies…”
48
 This is 
especially true for the EP. Academic literature has shown, that the EP can be analysed as a “normal 
parliament.” Therefore MEP´s tend to vote as per their party group.
49
 
 
This paper uses Pollack’s theoretical notions and these notions will be applied to all actors. That means 
that the European Institutions (such as the Council, the commission and the EP) and interest groups 
(such as business interest groups and citizen’s interest groups) are seen as rational actors. In line with 
the theory, the outcome of the European institutions will be seen as a result of collective action. The 
business interest group will be analysed in a way, as to only represent the wellbeing of their clientele, 
which is in contrast to citizen’s interest groups. This paper assumes that the later act in favour of the 
wellbeing of the greater society. In this case, it would be to favour of the traffic light regulation and 
therefore aiming to have a more healthy European population. The European institutions (EP, Council 
and Commission) are seen as actors which have to make the “best” decision, choosing from a range of 
different paths to go. For this paper, the EU institutions would have to choose to be in favour of the 
traffic light food labelling or against it. Moreover, as Pollack mentions, institutions can influence 
actors. Here, the institutions will be operationalized as business interest groups and consumer interest 
groups. The paper wants to find out, if the EP has been influenced by the institutions representing 
business interests. The possibility that this influence might have happened on formal and also on 
informal ways will be taken into consideration in the analysis. Informal ways of influencing will be 
seen in this research by the contact via Emails or personal contact. Finally, as the theory mentioned, it 
will be assumed that decision makers don´t possess full information regarding the topic they have to 
decide upon, but are dependent on the knowledge they acquire and by their own consciousness. In the 
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analysis, there is the possibility for the stimulus of exogenous influence, which cannot be examined 
from the research point of this paper will be taken into consideration. These exogenous factors, which 
might have influenced the decision cannot be viewed and analysed with the method in this project. 
 
Presentation of the theoretical positions from Scharpf 
As mentioned the contributions of Scharpf will be presented now. He focuses among other things at 
concept of institutions and applies this concept to organisations and corporate actors. Scharpf mentions 
that actors are categorised by their preferences and by their abilities.
50
 Institutions can be socially 
organised rules and ways of action which affect individual actors. Actors are dependent on socially 
constructed rules in order to have a reference point for their daily tasks and actions. Scharpf refers to 
such norms as “common knowledge.”51 Furthermore, the author refers that political science mainly 
studies composite actors (such as political parties’ government ministries or international 
organisations) which are created as per pre-existing rules and which are dependent on certain rules for 
their future presence. Individual actors within such an institution are therefore acting in a common 
framework which is seen as reference point for their actions and decisions. For this reason, institutions 
set a limit to the possible amount of decisions which can be made. Moreover, these institutions set and 
influence the way in which decisions and agreements will be made and the institutions (or rules of 
conducting policy) will therefore outline the preferences of actors with regards to the available 
options.
52
 However one needs to note, that such institutions cannot decide on outcomes in a pre-
determined way. Institutions can set a “… considerable scope for the strategic and tactical choices of 
purposeful actors.”53 
   In this project, the above mentioned concept of “institution” is operationalized by applying the 
concept to the co-decision procedure. The co-decision procedure sets the rule of the game as how the 
decision regarding food labelling will be done (a socially constructed institution). Moreover the actors 
to which the theory refers will be seen in this project being the food interest group (FoodDrinkEurope), 
the consumer and health interest group and the European Institutions (especially the EP and the later 
described Rapporteur). These actors are the ones who are most important in order to figure out if the 
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EP had been influenced by business interest groups. It is part of the co-decision procedure that the EP 
orders a rapporteur and the responsible committee to prepare amendments and suggestions regarding 
the Commission’s proposal. With the help of Scharpf´s concepts it will be easier to follow the working 
of the EP and to better understand the reason for the decision by the EP.  
 
Presentation of Greenwoods and  Michalowitz theoretical aspects 
Furthermore, next to the above mentioned rational choice theory there are other aspects in the literature 
dealing with lobbyism. Greenwood focuses among other things also at the influence of lobbyist at the 
EP, which is of secondary importance to interest groups is the European Parliament.
54
 It stands right 
after the Commission because of its ability to amend legislation. As per Greenwood, the EP is the most 
unpredictable of all the EU decision making bodies.55 In addition, the EP´s standing committees and 
rapporteurs can both be target of lobbying activities. Most of the lobbying activity which is directed at 
the EP goes until the first reading. Thereafter it is more and more difficult because inter-institutional 
discussion increases and the amount of lobbying thereafter decreases.
56
 The notions of Greenwood will 
be used to examine if the EP is an unpredictable actor and if the EP and/or the EP´s working groups 
have been influenced by lobbyist interest groups.  
 
Besides this, it is important for this project to mention the findings of Michalowitz. This author looks at 
the conditions under which interest groups get active and what kind of influence they exercise. The 
most relevant aspects of the theory are going to be presented.  These are at first, the degree of conflict 
between private actors and decision makers and secondly the type of exercised influence.57 
Regarding the first aspect in Michalowitz´paper the degree of conflict, the author mentions, that interest 
groups with similar goals form advocacy coalitions. The stronger this coalition, the more likely it is that 
they will try to influence the legislative process. In addition, interest groups prefer to maintain a present 
status quo (regarding a certain policy) or change the present status quo towards their own interests.
58
 
With regards to the type of influence exercised, the author refers to the amount of conflict between 
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interest groups and decision makers. There is a relatively sturdy amount of conflict, if the interest group 
wishes to change fundamental parts of a legislative proposal. Michalowitz concept type of interest 
refers to the aspect of conflict “…to which the political core interest of the decision-making institutions 
in a draft legislative act is touched.”
59
 Therefore it is likely that interest groups will be active if these 
groups can change details of a policy proposal, which does not run against the core content of a 
legislative proposal. In addition, this so called “technical influence” should also not be aimed against 
the main wishes and ideas of politicians.Michalowitz speaks of a “weak degree of conflict” in which 
the preferences of interest groups do not run against the core interests of the decision makers. 
Moreover, interest groups might be able to invoke a mind change among the decision makers.
60 
   The above mentioned advocacy coalition will be seen in this paper as lobby head groups (here Food 
Drinks Europe and consumer interest and health organisations, who will be named later in the analysis) 
and the findings of Michalowitz will be applied to these advocacy coalitions. The paper will examine if 
these advocacy coalitions try to influence the EP in their opinion about the food traffic light. Regarding 
the concept “Type of influence”, this project will look if the food traffic light regulation is a core part 
of the whole food labelling proposal or if the food traffic light initiative is just a minor aspect of the 
whole Commissions initiative (2008 white paper) to improve the food labelling standards. 
 
Criticism towards the presented rational choice theory 
Pollack also mentions that there exists internal and external criticism to rational choice theory. The 
most important aspects regarding internal criticism, is that rational choice scholars tend to leave out 
alternative explanations for a certain policy outcome. In addition, it is possible that there is an over 
interpretation of the examined data, which might lead to wrong conclusions. With regards to external 
criticism, Pollack mentions that European institutions have an “educational” impact on the behaviour of 
individuals. Pollack speaks of a “transformative impact” of European integration on individuals 
choices. However, this external influence is often left out by researchers.
61
 For this reason, the analysis 
part of this project will take possible external influences into consideration. Such external influence 
could be due to the knowledge of European politicians of other similar food labelling directives. In 
addition, it could also be possible that the EU institutions, which are seen in this project as represented 
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by the EP, the Commission, the Council and all the responsible working groups have an influence on 
the decision makers. This possible impact will be taken into consideration doing the analysis. Finally 
there is no need to find any criticism regarding the theoretical aspects of Greenwood and Michalowitz, 
since both state their contributions in the conjunctive (regarding the syntax).   
 
 
Analysis 
 
As already mentioned in the methods section the Commission’s proposal (as a starting point) will be 
presented, followed by the preferences of the interests group and the actual adopted resolution by the 
EP. Thereafter the internal development of the traffic light proposal will be examined and analysed. 
This section will be followed by the application of the theoretical perspective.  Then there will be a 
presentation of the findings from the anti-lobby NGO (CEO) along with a possible explanation of how 
the MEP´s could have been influenced. This section will end with a concluding section and with a 
section presenting some afterthoughts. 
 
Presentation of and of the positions of interest groups 
To start with the analysis, the Commissions 2008 policy proposal (2008/0028 (COD)) will be briefly 
summarised. Here it is important to emphasis the main issues the Commission wanted to achieve with 
their food labelling proposal. The 2008 policy proposal on food labelling takes its point of departure 
from previous food labelling policies (see background chapter). The most important novelty of the 
proposal is the suggestion of having nutritional labelling. “It allows for the development of best 
practice in the presentation of nutrition information, including alternative forms of expression of the 
nutrition information in relation to overall daily nutrient requirements or graphical forms of 
presentation.”
62
A further new aspect of the Commissions initiative is the binding requirement for food 
producers to document on the front of the package the volumes of “…energy, fat, saturates, 
carbohydrates with specific reference to sugars and salt expressed as amounts per 100g or per 100 ml 
or per portion in the principal field of vision (front of pack)…”.63 
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As mentioned in the method sections, attention will be paid to the food traffic light development.  
   After having presented the Commissions initial statements, the positions of interest groups will be 
outlined in brief. The analysis will follow the main method presented in the methodology section. The 
issues and preferences of the lobby groups will be presented and then compared to the actual policy 
outcome.  At first the positions of consumer interest groups and health interest groups will be 
mentioned. The online newspaper Euractive lists 14 European wide Health and Consumer 
Organisations who clearly support the food traffic light regulation. Among the advocates of the food 
traffic light are the Standing Committee of European Doctors, the European Heart Network, the 
European Public Health Alliance and the Pharmaceutical Group of the European Union (just to name a 
few).
64
 The consumer interest groups are suggesting of having a multiple colour coding on front of 
each package (in red, yellow and green) in order to indicate the high/low levels of nutrition elements 
per 100g/100ml. These organisations clearly position themselves against the labelling which is 
preferred by the industry (in %of Guided Daily Allowance).
65
 The main argument is that the food 
traffic light provides an easy way for consumers to see if a certain nutrition level is exists in a low, 
medium or high concentration. It is enough to outline the position of European Society of Cardiology 
because they state on their webpage that they and “…12 other European Health and consumer 
communities to urge Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to vote in favour of a traffic light 
system for food labelling today”.
66
The main arguments are that the traffic light labelling will help 
consumers to make a well informed decision and that this would contribute to decrease the amount of 
cardiovascular disease. The proposal form these groups is to have a colour coding (red, yellow and 
green) of harmful nutrients (salt, fat saturated fat and sugars).  
 
On the other side are business interest groups who are against the good traffic light. The food industry 
is mainly represented by the CIAA (Confederation of Food and Drink Industries of the EEC). From 
2011, the CIAA was renamed to FoodDrinkEurope. This business representation is regarding the traffic 
light policy, against it and prefers its own developed measurement. As per FoodDrinkEurope, the GDA 
(Guideline Daily Amount) should be preferred instead of the traffic light regulation. As per their 
findings, the GDA regulation is more consumers friendly and offers a better overview of the actual 
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content.67 “Too simplistic or coloured information about the nutrient content of a product risks 
distracting from the right information and confusing the consumer.”
68
 Therefore FoodDrinkEurope 
suggests having the following nutrition labelling requirements:  
“CIAA believes that Mandatory Nutrition Labelling should comprise the following (1): 
Front of Pack: 
• GDA icon for Energy (i.e. values for energy are expressed in the absolute amount per portion and its 
percentage of the Guideline Daily Amounts), in line with the CIAA ‘’GDA Style Guide’’. 
 
Back of Pack: 
• Big 8 nutrients (energy, protein, carbohydrates, sugars, fat, saturated fat, fibre and sodium (2) ) to be 
expressed per 100g/100ml” 
 
The Guideline Daily Amounts (GDAs) are a guideline of how much energy and nutrition’s are in a 
certain portion of food (or drinks). In addition, the GDAs represent an amount of certain nutritional 
aspects (such as salt fat or sugar) as a percentage of person´s daily nutritional needs. These are 
guidelines for a balanced diet for an average adult.  
 
The development of the traffic light policy proposal within the EP 
After having presented the positions of the interest groups, the paper will now go along to present the 
internal development of the food traffic light within the EU.  
For the 19th of April 2010, the EP´s working committee for Environment, Public Health and Food 
Safety prepared a report for the parliament in which they presented their draft legislative resolution 
regarding the Commissions 2008 White paper proposal. In the report of this Committee (prepared for 
the EP´s first reading at the 19
th
 of May 2010), the Rapporteur came to the conclusion to reject a colour 
coding (traffic light) for packaged foods. “The limit values for classification using the three traffic light 
colours, red, amber and green, are set arbitrarily, and the range within any one of these colours is too 
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big.”69 The rapporteur continues to argue,that the “traffic light” system would be discriminating 
towards other basic foods and so called “imitation foods” would be privileged due to their artificial 
ingredients. For this reason, the rapporteur fears that this food labelling might be misleading for the 
consumers and might contribute to cause malnutrition. “Therefore neither the Commission nor your 
Rapporteur is recommending such a component for mandatory food labelling.”
70
 Moreover, the 
rapporteur advises that it is more important to focus on educational campaigns to inform the public 
about the basic facts regarding a healthy living.
71
 
 
At the decision of the EP´s first reading (16.6.2010), the EP decided to reject the food traffic light and 
to have a different form to express the nutritional amounts. EP adopted a regulation regarding the 
package of pre-packed food, compelling producers that “…the "front of pack mandatory nutrition 
declaration" shall include the amount of energy in kcal and the mandatory nutrients expressed in grams. 
It shall be presented in a clear format in the following order: energy, fat, saturates, sugars, and salt.”
72
 
Furthermore, in article 31 the EP stated the in which form the nutrition’s shall be presented. As will be 
shown the presentation of the nutritional amount is very much in line with the GDA regulation which 
has been promoted by FoodDrinkEurope (consult Appendix to see the food labelling guidelines which 
have been adopted by the EP and the proposal presented by FoodDrinkEuorpe). Besides presenting the 
five main categories (energy, fat, saturates, sugars, and salt), the amount of each of these five 
ingredients should be visualised as per 100g/ml. “The mandatory nutrition declaration shall be 
expressed, as appropriate, as a percentage of the reference intakes (…) per 100 g or per 100 ml or per 
portion.”73 
 
Analysis of the Rapporteurs recommendation regarding food labelling 
The official statement regarding this newly adopted legislative resolution is given by Renate Sommer 
(who is the rapporteur of the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Committee (ENVI)). She 
defended the resolution saying, that the colour coding system would not be suited for basic food (since 
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it was developed in the UK in order to label ready-made meals). She mentions the example that the 
food traffic light cannot differentiate between butter and half-fat margarine, both products would have 
to be labelled in red. Furthermore, she defends by mentioning examples from the United Kingdom 
where food producers where replacing sugar with starch, in order to have a better “performance” at the 
traffic light scheme as per their sugar contents. In fact, the product didn´t get “healthier” but it was due 
to this measure for the producer possible to get a better labelling.74 
Following the methodological approach of this project, it could be possible to assume that the EP has 
been influenced by the food interest groups. However, as per the explanation of the EP´s rapporteur 
Sommer, the decision of the EP is in line with Pollack’s notion of rational choice decision making.   
As per Pollack, decision makers make decisions under constraints. Part of his theory is that there are 
many different ways to go and politicians simply have to decide for one path to go. Therefore, by just 
applying a part of Pollack´s theory, it is possible to say as a preliminary sub conclusion, that the EP´s 
decision to reject the food traffic light and instead to promote the GDA regulation, is a result of rational 
choice decision making. 
However, there is evidence confirming the possibility that the EP has been influenced by the food 
industry. After these findings have been presented, they will be backed up with theoretical concepts 
form the theory chapter. 
 
At the 22nd of December 2009, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, 
published three documents (internal, to be found on the homepage of the EP) in which the working 
group presented their amendments to the Commissions 2008 proposal (2008/0028(COD)). The 
Committee suggested that the information about the nutritional levels should be given in an easy to 
understand presentation.
75
 In amendment 234, it is suggested, that besides the nutrition declaration as 
per 100g/100ml there is a need for additional explanatory information. “The available evidence has 
proven that a simplified labelling scheme which comprises multiple colour coding for easier and 
quicker interpretation of nutrition information is the best and preferred option for consumers.”76  The 
Committee defends its choice by referring to the European Heart Network, findings from the 
University of Sydney and to an expert report from the UK Food Standards Agency.  
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It is interesting to take a look at the chronological succession of the documents. In the Draft Report 
(11.11.2009) and in the latest Report (19.4.2010) before the EP had to vote on the traffic light proposal, 
the Committee came to the conclusion to reject this proposal. The arguments for this have been 
mentioned above. However, the above mentioned amendments have been published at the 22.12.2009, 
half a year before the EP had to vote on the traffic light proposal. This fits with the widely held 
perception that the EP has been following the voting recommendations from the food industry (as 
presented in the introduction section).  
Besides the online newspapers such as Euractive
77
 and the Euobserver
78
, the NGO Corporate Europe 
Observatory (an organisation which tries to uncover the influence of business interest groups at the EU) 
comes to the conclusion that the EP has been following the interest of the food industry.79However, 
there are also counter arguments put forward by newspapers, in which they praise the new EU 
regulation and in which they present their criticism towards the traffic light proposal (for instance: Die 
Zeit, in article: “Mit Ampelfarben gegen Dickmacher?” from 16.06.2010)  
 
Application of the projects theoretical standpoint 
However, while applying the theoretical aspects (Michalowitz and Greenwood) there is additional 
evidence to believe that the European Parliament has been following the interests of FoodDrinkEurope. 
After the application of these two scholars Pollack and Scharpf will be used as well.  
Greenwood mentioned that the EP is the second most important institution within the EU, due to its 
power to amend the legislative outcome. For this reason the EP and its rapporteurs are as per 
Greenwood a target of lobbying activities. This could be a possible explanation why the EP and the 
rapporteur rejected the food traffic light (in the case of the rapporteur, it was given a negative vote). 
Based on the documents which were used for this analysis, it is possible to confirm Greenwoods theory 
who sees the EP as an unpredictable actor. Following the official statements from the rapporteur R. 
Sommer, the reasons why the EP rejected the food traffic light were not due to the possibility that it 
might create difficulties with the Member States but that it might lead to a misinformation of 
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consumers.80 However, her explanation stands in contrast to the 14 European wide consumer and health 
groups which advocate in favour of the traffic light regulation.
81
Moreover the rapporteur committee 
themselves referred to the European Heart Network which is a part of the above mentionedconsumer 
groups. In addition, they also consult academic research (University of Sydney) and the British Food 
Standards Agency, which also favour the traffic light proposal. Furthermore, the NGO Corporate 
Europe Observatory present in their findings that FoodDrinkEurope spend 1 billion € in their campaign 
to eradicate the traffic light regulation.  
 
Besides Greenwood, the theoretical contribution of Michalowitz will be used now. Regarding the 
aspect of advocacy coalitions is applicable to the present case. Many European wide acting food 
companies are represented by FoodDrinkEurope.82 This is done by these food companies in order to 
focus their strength and form a strong collation which is able to successfully represent their interest. 
The stronger such a coalition, the more likely it is that these companies will have a possible legislative 
influence. Based on the information available for this project, it was FoodDrinkEuropes main aim to 
promote the GDA proposal. Consulting the official webpage of this interest group, there is no support 
that the interest group has been completely against the Commissions 2008 White paper regarding food 
labelling. While looking at the information presented, the interest groups main concern was about the 
presentation of nutritional information and not if there should be such a kind of nutritional information 
or not. Therefore, as per Michalowitz´ theory there is no big conflict between the interest group and the 
Commission’s proposal. This paper is not going to compare the whole Commissions proposal with the 
interests of the Food Lobby group, however with regards to the research question, the main issue was 
in the way nutritional information should be displayed. The Commissions standpoint in 2008 was just 
to improve the present food labelling information. The food traffic light issue only came in the EP 
rapporteur suggestion.  And also there, the committee seemed to be confused about its position. In 
some documents the food traffic light proposal/coloured nutritional information was praised, while in 
other documents the rapporteur committee clearly positioned themselves against the traffic light 
proposal. In addition, it has never been mentioned from the side of the business interest group, that 
there shouldn´t be any kind of nutritional labelling. Therefore, as the author of the theory mentioned, 
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because the main aspects of the food labelling proposal are not been challenged by the interest groups 
there is little resistance from the side of the rapporteur committee and from the EP. As Michalowtiz 
assumed, interest groups will be in such cases active to lobby. The findings so far only confirm the 
author’s assumption. In addition, since the interest group is only trying to change the form in which the 
nutrition is presented is this, seen from this projects standpoint as a minor adjustment and also, in 
linewith the projects interpretation of Michalowtiz theory regarding the effect of interest groups on 
small details/changes of a policy proposal.  
 
Application of Pollack and Scharpf 
Besides the theoretical concepts of the Michalowitz and Greenwood, it is also necessary to apply the 
rational choice perspective from Pollack and Scharpf onto the case of the traffic light. In line with the 
methodology it will be assumed at first that the European Institutions (here the EP) are acting in favour 
of the citizens interests. In contrast, the food industry will be assumed to act in favour of their clientele.              
   The first assumption of Pollack’s rational choice, that the collective decision is a result of individual 
decision making, is fulfilled. By looking at the previous findings, it is evident that the decision to reject 
the traffic light has not been taken by a few actors, but by the whole EP (which has been influenced by 
the rapporteur). Regarding the second assumption which states, that actors seek to maximise their own 
utility and don´t care much about the wellbeing of the greater society, my material does not provide 
evidence to make any statements about this second assumption. A final aspect of Pollack which is 
applicable to this research is his contribution regarding the influence of institutions on decisions. 
Institutions can have an influence on politicians. This gives further evidence to believe that the EP has 
been influenced by lobbyist influence groups. As already presented, also Scharpf mentions the concept 
of institutions and also points out that these shape the proposal and the action of the actors involved. 
Only because of the guidelines of the co-decision procedure the EP consults rapporteurs and shadow 
rapporteurs to come up with proposals and suggestions/amendments. In this project, the food interest 
group can be seen as a socially constructed institution which can influence the MEP´s. In relation to 
this, Pollack writes that such institutions can appear informally and are therefore difficult to grasp. 
Such an informal institution can be seen as the influence by the interest groups.It is part of the co-
decision procedure (which is seen in this project as an institution) that the EP has to “send out” its 
rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs in order to gather information and make amendments/suggestions 
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to the Commission’s proposal. Part of such official information gathering can be the influence of lobby 
groups, which use unofficial channels to influence the decision making outcome. Itis naturally not easy 
to get hold of such unofficial influence, however there is some evidence which confirms the 
assumption that lobbyist used unofficial channels of influence. The already mentions NGO Corporate 
Europe Observatory (CEO) found evidence that the MEP´s have received many mails and voting 
recommendation from the lobby group (FoodDrinkEurope) trying to encourage the MEP´s to vote in 
favour of the GDA proposal. On their homepage this Ngo presents a document titled: “‘Hard-core’ 
lobbying: a sample of “voting recommendations” sent by lobbyists to MEPs on the new EU food 
labelling regulation.”
83
 Just to give one example, the document presents a mail from the European 
Dairy Association (RDA), directed to the rapporteurs’ head Renate Sommer in which they strongly 
encourage not to vote in favour of the traffic light policy. “In line with CIAA, EDA rejects the call for 
nutrition labelling using colour-coding. The traffic light system of labelling is a subjective assessment 
of the nutrient content of 100g of a food and does not provide consumers with the information needed 
to choose a balanced diet based on their individual needs. In addition, ‘traffic lights’ don’t put the food 
in the context of the daily diet.”
84
 From the standpoint of this project, this is seen as an example of 
unofficial/hidden lobbyist influence. In the same document however (note: the document done by CEO 
in which they list all the mails written to MEP´s they could get hold off), there is a note put forward by 
the NGO in which they present a mail from Jo Jewell,Coordinator: Health Promotion and Disease 
Prevention, European Public Health Alliance in which he states that: “Independent, international 
research has provided convincing evidence to suggest that consumers find the multiple colour coding 
'traffic light system' the easiest to understand. This makes it clear to consumers whether a product 
contains low, medium or high levels of a certain nutrient, and helps them to make choices…).
85
 As 
Scharpf notices, actors acting in such an institutionalised framework see the European Institutions as a 
reference point to which they can address their wishes and preferences. Due to the nature of the co-
decision (three readings and or a conciliation process until an agreement has to be reached) there is a 
“natural” limit to the changes and inputs such a proposal can take (Scharpfs mentions that institutions 
such as the co-decision procedure, set a limit to the possible amount of decisions). If the co-decision 
procedure would be different (for instance by having direct input from European citizens or by having a 
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more technocratic way of decision making), it could be possible that the traffic light proposal would 
have not been rejected.  
 
The actual rejection of the food traffic light proposal could be a result of the possible fact, that the 
business interest groups have had more resources to influence the policy development. This would fit 
into Scharpf´s theory in which actors (here health lobby groups and business interest groups), have 
different preferences and abilities.  
 
How interest groups could have been active 
After having presented the theoretical arguments of why it is logical to believe that interest groups have 
affected the decision making in the Rapporteur and in the EP, there will be a brief outline how the 
Lobby group could have influenced the MEPs. The already mentioned NGO Corporate Europe 
Observatory (CEO) presents on their homepage an interview with MEP Carl Schlyter. The interview 
was published at the 11
th
 of June 2010, a few days before the EP rejected the food traffic light proposal. 
This additional insight knowledge should help to understand the reason for the rejection of the food 
traffic light. The MEP Schlyter, who is part of the (ENVI) and a shadow rapporteur on food labelling 
mentioned that many MEP´s have had received mails and position papers from the food industry. 
Schlyter mentions that due to the heavy industry pressure, once open-minded MEP´s shifted their focus 
and attention was given towards the suggestions from the industry. Moreover, he mentions that the 
ENVI Committee is more advanced than the EP and therefore the EP is likely to follow the 
ENVI/rapporteurs position. For this reason the main target of lobbyist is, as per Schlyter, the rapporteur 
(who is in this case German MEP Renate Sommer). As already mentioned earlier in this project, it is 
the task of the rapporteur to make amendments and changes to the Commission’s proposal. “So it 
means the direction the rapporteur is taking has a huge impact on how people [note: MEPs] think about 
the dossier.”
86
 Each political group appoints one shadow rapporteur who is responsible to keep track on 
a certain issue (in this case the food labelling directive). As per Schlyter these, shadow rapporteurs are 
important because they do all the negotiation and have a main impact in the report. “So they are the 
most important people to influence if you want to change parliament’s positions.”
87
 From the research 
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point of this project, there is no rational reason to belief that Schlyter is following a hidden agenda and 
therefore might not be a valid source of information.  
A final aspect which needs to be mentioned is the issue salience the traffic light proposal has for the 
food industry. A reasonable explanation is presented by CEO, in which they state that harsher labelling 
laws could decrease their sales on “unhealthy” food.
88
 
 
Final thoughts 
There have been put forward many arguments so far, why it is possible to assume that the EP and the 
responsible rapporteur (regarding the case of food labelling and the traffic light proposal) have been 
influenced by Lobbyist groups. So far, this project could only identify the influence of one lobby actor. 
(Lobby group: FoodDrinkEurope which represents the issues and interests of a wide variety of food 
producing companies. This Lobby represents the interest of different sectors such as the European 
Breakfast Cereal Association or the European Snacks Association. Besides such sectoral interest, 
FoodDrinkEurope also represents the interests of big international companies such as Heinz, Unilever 
or Coca-Cola. For further information regarding their membership please consult their webpage.
89
) 
However there is the possibility that other companies or organisations might have also influenced the 
EP but there is no need to investigate further if there have been other actors active because it is the aim 
of the project to examine if the EP has have been influenced by Lobby food lobby groups. It is not of 
interest to this project which actors could have influenced the EP. In addition, it is difficult to examine 
if the MEP´s have had an initial standpoint regarding food labelling (or to analyse the influence of 
exogenous factors). The research conducted to this aspect couldn´t find any results. This project notices 
that the MEP´s might have had an initial standpoint and position towards GDA and the food traffic 
lights. It could be that the initial standpoint of the MEPs was already close to the standpoint of the Food 
interest group. This project is aware of this fact and will take this in the conclusions section into 
consideration. Moreover, there might be a possibility that the MEP´s might have had some knowledge 
about a traffic light policy. This traffic light food labelling has already been implemented in the UK. In 
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2006, the British Food Standards Agency has encouraged food companies to implement coloured food 
labelling.
90
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
After having done the analysis of this paper, the findings will be briefly summarised and a final answer 
to the Research Question will be given. Thereafter, a reflection upon the methodological standpoint of 
this paper will be presented. 
To conclude and to answer the research question there is enough evidence to belief that the European 
Parliament has been influenced by the interests of the food industry. This assumption is only valid 
regarding the proposal for food labelling (traffic light system vs. Guidance Daily Allowance system).  
There cannot be any 100% certainty that the EP hasn´t been influenced by food lobbyist, but there have 
been presented many arguments in this project while it is possible to belief. At first, to be in line with 
the methodology used for this project, comparing the EP´s position regarding nutrition labelling with 
the recommendations by the food industry one can see there are huge similarities. The EU almost 
adopted 1:1 the recommendations by the food industry (see Appendix). There are just a few deviations 
(such as: the EP writes that the guidelines should be regarding a middle aged woman, whereas the 
Lobby Group refers to adult´s guideline daily amount). However, the basic principle of presenting the 
amount of nutrition’s such as salt or sugar remains to be in percentage (which is as per the opinion of 
consumer health organisations and academic literature an insufficient and uneasy way of expression the 
nutritional facts). Secondly, the research found out, that the rapporteurs had the knowledge that the 
traffic light system would outmatch the GDA system and were advocating for this, at first. Then a few 
months before the EP rejected this proposal, the latest report from the rapporteurs rejected the traffic 
light system. It is therefore quite likely that the food industry might have influenced the rapporteurs.  
This assumption is backed up by the findings from CEO. Finally, also the application of the theoretical 
parts gives reason to belief that the EP followed business interest. The application of Michalowitz and 
Greenwood´s concepts has further confirmed the likeliness that there has been a successful lobbyist 
influence in the EP. This is further confirmed by the application of Pollacks and Scharpfs concepts. The 
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latter two scholars and their use of rational choice theory, have further contributed to confirm the 
presence of lobbyist influence. Their input was mainly to shed light from an institutional (formal and 
informal perspective) and from an actor centred level.  
At this point it is difficult to speculate about the reasons why the rapporteur or the EP in the end, voted 
against the food traffic lights. Especially since there is evidence that these actors might have known 
that the traffic light regulation the better system is. One reason could be due to too little lobbyist 
influence form the side of the consumer and health organisations (which could possibly be because 
these groups might not have that many financial and personal resources- to keep up with the industrial 
lobbying).  
  The official statement from the EP is that it is easier for consumers to understand the nutritional 
values of a product. However, this stands in contrast to the findings of consumer and health 
organisations and also against academic findings (who state that the traffic light system is much easier 
for consumers to understand. There hasn´t been an analysis on how the Food Lobby came to their on 
recommending the GDA regulation, however as has been shown it seems likely that the GDA system is 
preferred in order to “hide” unhealthy food and to maintain sales. However, this can only be an 
assumption which is almost impossible to confirm academically.  
 
Finally, a further piece of evidence which can give further certainty that the EP has been lobbied is 
given in the literature. General findings in academic literature state that especially the EP is open to the 
input of Lobbyists. “In the Parliament, there is agreement among most MEPs and civil servants that 
lobbying is acceptable and has increased significantly over the past decade.”91 Unlike the Council the 
EP and the Commission are more open the interest group influence and receives a lot of input from 
interest organisations.92 This is partly due to the very weak Lobby regulation in the European 
Parliament which lacks any sanctions.93 
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Afterthoughts 
 
This section will present some reflections about the methods used in this project and will briefly 
present other related aspects, which could be studied in future research. 
The method used in this project and the information form the anti-lobby NGO have contributed to 
answer the research question and thus it is possible to say, that the MEPs have been influenced by 
lobbyist. The reasons why the MEPs rejected the food traffic light can be many and it will probably 
never be fully possible to reconstruct their motives. However, after having consulted the 
recommendations from the rapporteurs and after having seen the debate in Parliament (in video format 
recording) one can be sure that the MEP´s have had a good picture about the benefits of food traffic 
light system.94The official statement was that the food traffic light system would not be clear enough 
for the consumer to understand. R. Sommer uses the example that fruit juice would get a red mark (due 
to the amounts of natural sugar) and diet coke a green label. However, a possible solution might have 
been to introduce traffic light labelling to pre-packed meals, since these often contain high amounts of 
salt and fat, which are at first sight not that easy for consumers to detect.95 
   From the present standpoint, it does not seem likely that if other methods had been used (such as 
process tracing or attributed influence). Each of these methods has their flaws (as presented in the 
methods chapter) and cannot guarantee certainty.  A possible way, if this project would be redone, 
would be to use the method of triangulation to this case and to compare the outcomes. This might be a 
possibility of increasing validity and certainty. However, while looking at the answer of this paper, it 
seems unlikely that the other methods might have come up with another answer. In addition to this, it 
could also be of interest to examine if the decision by the EP was a case of an early agreement between 
Council, Parliament, and Commission and fast rack decision making. However, it wasn´t possible to 
gather the necessary information form the Councils homepage. Rejection by the EP could be due to the 
fact that Council and Commission have already been against the traffic light proposal. This paper has 
mainly focused on the data which indicates that business lobbying has taken place. However, in a 
further research it could be of interest to analyse the effectiveness of the already mentioned lobby 
regulation scheme.  
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Appendix 
 
Proposal adopted by the EP regarding the expression of nutritional information 
 
Article 31  
Forms of expression  
1. The amount of energy and nutrients or their components referred to in  
Article 29(1) and (2) shall be expressed using the measurement units listed in  
▌Annex XII. 
2. The ‘front of pack mandatory nutrition declaration’ shall include the  
amount of energy in kcal as set out in Article 29(1)(a) and the mandatory nutrients  
in Article 29(1)(b) expressed in grams.  
It shall be presented in a clear format in the following order: energy, fat,  
saturates, sugars, and salt.  
3. The ‘back of pack mandatory nutrition declaration’ shall include the  
amount of energy in kcal and all the mandatory nutrients referred to in Article  
29(1) and where appropriate the voluntary nutrients referred to in Article 29(2).  
It shall be expressed as appropriate, in the order of presentation provided for in  
Part C of Annex XII, both per 100 g/ml and per portion.  
It shall be presented in tabular form, with the numbers aligned. 
4. The mandatory nutrition declaration shall be expressed, as appropriate, as a  
percentage of the reference intakes set out in Part B of Annex X in relation to per  
100 g or per 100 ml or per portion. When provided, the declaration on vitamins and  
minerals shall also be expressed as a percentage of the reference intakes set out in  
point 1 of Part A of Annex X.  
5. If indications pursuant to paragraph 4 are provided, the following  
additional information must be indicated in close proximity to the table concerned:  
‘Average daily requirement of a middle-aged woman. Your personal daily  
requirement may differ.’.
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Proposal from FoodDrinkEurope regarding the labelling of nutritional information 
What are GDAs 
Guideline Daily Amounts (GDAs) are a guide to how much energy and nutrients are present in a portion of a food or 
beverage and what each amount represents as a percentage of a person’s daily dietary needs. 
In short, Guideline Daily Amounts are: 
• Guidance for a balance diet: the amount of energy and nutrients in a portion for the average adult. 
• Information at-a-glance: making it easier for consumers to see what proportion of their daily nutritional needs are 
met. 
• Widely-used: information on close to 100% of major food company products by the end of 2009, with many small 
and medium-sized businesses also adopting the approach. 
• Science-based: rely on nutrition recommendations from the Eurodiet project, a panel of scientific and policy experts 
established by the European Commission. 
 
• Front-of-Pack GDA Labels 
• A “Front-of-Pack” FOP label, such as the one below, shows the energy (i.e. calories) provided by a portion of the 
product, as well as what percentage of an adult’s energy needs is provided by one portion. 
•  
 
• The CIAA labelling  scheme leaves companies  free to list more than energy content on the front of packaging if 
they so choose, and if label and product size allow. 
43 
• Some companies have chosen to list all five figures on the front-of-pack label while others have chosen to show 
these on the back-of-pack.  
•  
• Back-of-Pack GDA Labels 
• Back-of-Pack (BOP) labels provide nutrition information per portion for a more detailed list of nutritional contents (at 
a minimum: energy, sugar, fat, saturated fat, and sodium/salt).  A back-of-pack label might also look like this: 
•  
• A 250 ml portion provides 
•  
44 
• of an adult´s guideline daily amount*97 
• * The nutritional needs of individuals may be higher or lower, 
based on gender, age, level of physical activity and other factors. 
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